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A soft-law approach is followed in the UK for improving gender diversity on boards. This paper explores 
the causes and solutions of gender homogeneity on British boards by interviewing thirty-three board 
members of FTSE 350 companies. Results suggest that British boards are homogeneous due to 
discrimination against women, a lack of confidence among women and a lack of objectivity in nomination 
processes. While current soft-law approach is the best-suited strategy due to established institutional 
processes, there is an increasing demand for more intrusive statutory action if the current approach fails 
to achieve gender parity, soon enough. The paper contributes to Institutional theory, public policy and 
corporate praxis. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Diversity on corporate boards is recommended across the world by scholars of corporate governance (e.g. 
Cornforth, 2001; Hillman et al., 2002; Long, 2007; Kim et al., 2014). Gender diversity is advocated to 
improve board performance (e.g. Huse & Solberg, 2006; Nielsen & Huse, 2010) and corporate governance 
(Terjesen et al., 2009). In the UK, the Higgs Review (2003) and the Tyson Report (2003) recommend 
recruiting Non-Executive Directors from a diverse pool. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) (UK 
CG Code) also recommends diversity on the boards of public listed companies (PLCs) to encourage 
constructive debate and prevent ‘groupthink’. The FRC’s guidance (2011) recommends the nomination of 
board directors from a pool of different personal attributes. 
 Regulatory initiatives are deployed in a number of countries to increase gender diversity on boards 
(Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013). Regulatory authorities have adopted different diversity management 
approaches to improve gender diversity on corporate boards. While ten countries have implemented quotas 
through a legislative action for female representation on boards of directors, fifteen more countries have 
introduced non-binding gender quotas in their corporate governance codes (Terjesen et al, 2015). A number 
of other countries’ scholars and regulators are contemplating actions to improve gender diversity on boards 
(Terjesen et al., 2015). 
 In the UK, the Davies Report recommended (Whitehead & Normand, 2011) that the FTSE 100 companies 
achieve voluntary targets by 2015. The corporate sector in the UK responded favourably, and the target was 
met amid the political volatility of parliamentary elections and Brexit (Department for Business, Innovation 
& Skills (BIS), 2015; Higginbottom, 2015). The Davies Review has now invoked FTSE 350 companies to 
voluntarily attain 33% gender diversity on their boards by 2020 (BIS, 2015). However, the pace of gender 
diversity improvement is stagnating and in 2016, UK boards witnessed a particularly low intake of female 
board directors (Financial Times, 2016). The reasons and solutions for the lack of gender parity need to be 
investigated. Whether or not the soft-law approach (Terjesen et al., 2015) adopted in the UK is effective in 
achieving the objective is also worth exploring. 
 British boards are an interesting subject of research on board diversity as now the UK has the fifth highest 
gender diversity on its boards of PLCs. Hence a qualitative study is conducted to address the research gap 
by interviewing thirty-three board directors of FTSE 350 companies. The academic inquiry that this paper 
attempts to answer is how to make British boards more gender diverse. In order to answer the research 
question, the study first explores the reasons for gender homogeneity on British boards. 
 Participants in the study claim that discrimination against women, the resultant lack of confidence among 
women, and the lack of objectivity in the nomination process are the primary reasons for gender 
homogeneity on boards in the UK. A multipronged approach is required by the regulatory authorities to 
deal with this historical problem. Study participants suggest that the listed companies may be asked to 
submit non-financial disclosure describing their gender diversity policy and status of their boards. The 
respondents agree that the current soft-law approach of recommending voluntary targets is the most suited 
to the UK. However, many participants recommend statutory intervention for a limited period, if the current 
approach fails to bring gender balance soon enough. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The paper briefly discusses different governance regimes 
with a particular focus on the UK. The UK governance regime is explained with reference to Institutional 
theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), followed by the study approach and main findings. The findings are 
presented in two categories: causes and solutions of gender homogeneity on British boards. Finally, we 
present the conclusions as well as contribution and the limitations of the paper. 
 
THE SOFT-LAW REGIME WITHIN THE UK AND ITS CHALLENGES 
 
Under-utilization of women’s talents at the top, decision-making levels, and the need for a change in the 
approach by the political class and the corporate world have been felt by the many regulatory regimes 
(Terjesen et al., 2015). The Women on boards report (Whitehead & Normand, 2011) describes three 
approaches that are adopted in different countries to improve gender diversity on corporate boards. First is 
legislative intervention or mandatory quotas, as exemplified by Norway, and followed by a few other 
countries globally, including Italy, Germany, Spain, France and India (Egon Zehnder, 2014; Sealy et al., 
2016). Secondly, the USA and Canada adopt a liberal approach and expect voluntary commitments from 
private firms (Whitehead & Normand, 2011). The third is a collaborative, business-led approach of 
recommending targets to improve gender diversity on boards, as adopted in the UK (Sealy et al., 2016). 
Companies are expected to voluntarily take measures and comply, or explain the failure (UK CG Code, 
2014). 
 The approach adopted in the UK for managing gender diversity on its PLC boards underpins Institutional 
theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory suggests that a set of processes becomes authoritative 
guidelines for social behaviour, and is adopted over time and space (Scott, 2004). These processes may 
have an impact on individuals and organizations without actually being incorporated into formal policies 
(Meyer, 2008). Such rules/institutions are made by state and professional bodies and can be coercive, 
normative or voluntary in nature (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2004). Such practices evolve with other 
institutions and are adopted by organizations, thus becoming institutionalized (Terjesen, 2015). 
 
Gender diversity management and the influence of institutional processes 
The influence of institutional processes is exemplified in the emphasis on the rights of women, which has 
significantly influenced both policy and practice, globally (Bradley & Ramirez, 1996; Meyer, 2008). A 
country’s institutional environment and corporate policies on diversity management are interlinked and are 
influenced by gender-sensitive welfare provisions, and path-dependent policy initiatives for gender equality 
(Terjesen et al., 2015: Goyal et al., 2018). 
 Existing research also suggests other institutional factors which influence gender diversity on boards, such 
as the gender diversity in executive positions, gender pay gap, history of female political representation 
(Terjesen et al., 2009), and the economic/cultural environment in countries (Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; 
Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013). As a result, the policy and the practice on the rights of women vary globally. 
 In both the Anglo-American system and Continental Europe, the law is an essential component of 
governance (Peters, 2011). In much of Continental Europe, society is significantly influenced by the state, 
but the Anglo-American political tradition assigns a less significant role to the state (Peters, 2011). In 
Common Law region, law is a more evolutionary and less deliberative a process (Peters, 2011). The UK 
follows the Common Law tradition, and the UK CG Code (2014) is based on the principle of ‘comply or 
explain’. As a result, regulatory agencies in the UK recommend, without a coercive mandate, that FTSE 
100/350 companies voluntarily enhance the gender diversity on their boards. The strategy has initially 
delivered favourable results, with the FTSE 100 boards attaining 26% gender diversity in 2015. 
 However, considering the lack of further progress and unimpressive fresh intake of female board members 
(Sealy et al., 2016) we attempt to investigate the causes and solutions for gender homogeneity on British 
boards. We also explore whether or not the current soft-law approach of diversity management on boards 
in the UK is effective enough in obtaining the objective. 
 
METHODOLOGY OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Methodologically the study is based on Sociological Institutional theory that often involves qualitative and 
highly interpretive approach (Meyer, 2008). Thus, we conduct a qualitative study based on one-to-one, 
face-to-face interviews with thirty-three board director – thirteen female and twenty male – from FTSE 350 
companies. The data is collected through elite interviews (Dexter, 1970) to ensure that issues lying at the 
core of the interaction are elicited comprehensively (Culpepper & Gilbert, 1999). Interviews are the most 
widely used qualitative research methodology in research, investigating people’s personal perspective and 
personal context in detail (Ritchie et al., 2003). Conducting board-related research through interviews has 
been a challenge due to difficulty in accessing the board members (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Thus, 
interviewing board members is categorized as elite interviewing (Pettigrew, 1992). 
 In this study, the respondents are first approached from the database of the business school with which 
the authors are affiliated. The participants are first selected as per the criterion of their having experience 
as board directors in at least one FTSE 350 company. Subsequently, other participants are approached using 
the snowball methodology (Goodman, 1961) of data collection (i.e. through the first set of respondents in 
the study). However, the purposiveness of the sample set, as determined for the first set, was maintained. 
The snowballing technique for interviewing board members has been successfully adopted in previous 
research and is considered essential for studies of this nature due to the element of trust and the sensitivity 
of the topic involved (e.g. Kakabadse et al., 2015; Broome & Krawiec, 2008). Also, the method of 
snowballing was resorted to, as board directors are a relatively small population, consisting of busy 
individuals, who may not associate themselves with individuals or projects without the recommendation of 
someone they trust (Broome et al., 2011). 
 Qualitative research often involves interpretive and complex data analysis, where the categories and 
theories emerge from the data (Snape & Spencer, 2003). Interpretive data analysis is expected to provide a 
plausible insight into a phenomenon in order to enable a deeper understanding of it. Such understanding is 
possible only through the interpretations of that phenomenon by the people living and experiencing it (Shah 
and Corley, 2006). In this study, data has been analysed thematically (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Saunders et 
al., 2009; Baumgartner & Schneider, 2010). Thematic analysis involves content/context for identifying 
themes, and analysis is linked to the respondents or the contributors (Spencer et al., 2003). 
 The transcript data is disaggregated into conceptual units of a similar nature which are given labels 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Thus data is coded and analysed to identify themes, and reveal patterns and 
relationships. Such categorization is saturated by continuing to collect more data on the category, until the 
researchers are convinced that further collection will not improve the results (Blaikie, 2009). 
 
STUDY FINDINGS 
 
 We now present the findings of the study in themes and sub-themes below, with illustrative quotes 
showing multiple nuances of respondents’ perceptions. Data analysis reveals two themes: the causes of 
gender homogeneity on British boards and the solutions to make boards gender diverse. 
 
Why are Boards Not Gender Diverse? 
 The participants point out three primary and interlinked causes of lack of gender diversity on British 
boards. The respondents claim homogeneous boards consisting of men may discriminate against female 
executives and directors. Such practices render the board nomination process lacking in objectivity and also 
result in a lack of confidence among women executives and directors. 
 
Discrimination 
 Discrimination against women is acknowledged both by male and female respondents. Study participants 
posit that discrimination in board nominations is conventional and is perpetrated due to board leaders’ desire 
to have the comfort of familiarity around them. 
 “Oh by definition there is [discrimination]! If they will consider only the people who went to certain 
 schools or the people who were like them, that is discrimination.” (Resp. 23 – Male) 
 Respondents acknowledge that such discrimination against women perpetuates as it is tough to document. 
As a result, scholars also assess discrimination against women through a proxy of poor gender diversity on 
boards (e.g. Dalton & Dalton, 2010; Hillman et al., 2002; Matsa & Miller, 2013; Singh et al., 2008). 
 “Yes, I am sure there was [discrimination]. I felt it, and I am sure there was. [But] it is very hard to 
 document that.” (Resp. 22 – Female) 
 Female participants narrate accounts of discrimination they suffered. They also argue that discrimination 
perpetrated against them was demoralizing for other female executives as well. 
  “I was offered a promotion with no pay increase and no grade change. Having a whole bunch of men 
 reporting to me, some of whom earned more than me. And they said ‘oh we can’t afford you a pay 
 rise’.” (Resp. 20 - Female) 
 “When my boss left the company, I was one of three directors, and I wasn’t even asked if I wanted to 
 replace him. The person who was asked was very much part of the old boys’ club. When he was 
 appointed, all these women managers came to me said ‘Oh, why didn’t you get that?’ Yeah.” (Resp. 15  
  Female) 
 However, the respondents in the study acknowledge that bias against women is often unconscious. The 
male members are often ignorant of the potential contribution that women directors can make in boards as 
they have traditionally been gender homogeneous. 
 “It has always been men up there. It has been a boys’ club. It has become a norm. But I am not sure how 
conscious that was.” (Resp. 21 – Female) 
 Also, discrimination against women appears to be on the ebb due to increased awareness and regulatory 
intervention. 
 “I am sure there has been some degree of discrimination in the past. But as the time goes on, that is less 
 and less likely.” (Resp. 33 – Male) 
 The finding supports the existing academic research on the subject as many companies are appointing 
diverse directors to signal their policy of non-discrimination (Bartlett, 2010). 
 
Nomination process – Still not objective 
 Discrimination against women in the nomination process also results in the process lacking objectivity. 
Many participants acknowledge that functioning nomination committees are still not a norm in FTSE 
companies. 
  “I don’t think it is objective. It is still someone who has worked with the Chief Executive before.” 
 (Resp. 29 – Female). 
 Integrity and objectivity of the nomination process is critical for promoting gender diversity. The lack of 
 objectivity in the process is the result of discrimination against women which has kept boards 
 homogeneous. 
 “I think the integrity of the nomination process is absolutely the key, in order to have people who are 
 prepared to say what they think. And to challenge and test the Chief Executive.” (Resp. 22 – Female) 
 The UK CG Code (2014) also upholds the integrity of nomination process. It recommends that only 
independent directors are appointed as the members/Chair of the nomination committee and only members 
are present in committee meetings. It also asks for the nomination committee to lead the process of 
nominating board directors and taking its decisions only after evaluating the balance of skills, experiences, 
knowledge and independence on boards (p.11). 
 Discrimination against women also results in a lack of confidence among female executives and directors, 
which is the third sub-theme of the causes of poor gender diversity on British boards. This is discussed 
below. Lack of confidence among female executives and directors Both male and female participants 
identify that discrimination against women leads to a lack of confidence among them about their ability to 
contribute on boards.  
 “I think many women lack confidence. I found myself lack confidence while speaking up at the board 
 meetings or whatever it was.” (Resp. 10 – Female) 
 “Most of the guys I approach, who tick 2 or 3 boxes in eligibility conditions say 'Yep, I am in'. If the 
 woman ticks 9 of 10 boxes and can’t tick the tenth one, she will say 'Sorry I am not qualified.' And that's 
 not uncommon.” (Resp. 17 – Male) 
 Lack of confidence among women aspiring to the top jobs has earlier been reported in academic studies 
(e.g. Burke & Richardsen, 2016; Foster, 2016). Such low confidence among women often leads to them not 
being appointed to board positions despite their being eligible. 
 “Now, what happens, because of that either lack of confidence or honesty from a female point of view, 
 is that the male often will succeed.” (Resp. 15 – Female) 
 Moreover, lack of confidence also makes women not actively network with decision makers to claim 
board positions. In the prevailing corporate culture, dominated by men, where aspirants actively promote 
themselves, this reticence on the part of female executives compromises their opportunities of board 
nominations (Burke & Richardsen, 2016). 
 “I think women are not that ready to promote themselves. They would very often think that they can’t 
 do it.” (Resp. 16 – Female) 
 A respondent shared a story of one female executive who almost did not get a coveted position just 
because she initially chose to wait to be asked instead of staking her claim for it. 
 “This lady now is one of the top general counsels of a FTSE top 10, all because she asked. And that's 
 the issue that we all have as women who don’t think that we are good enough, and we don’t think to 
 ask.” (Resp. 20 – Female) 
 The paper now discusses the solutions for gender homogeneity on British boards. 
 
How to make boards gender diverse 
 The study participants believe that in a governance regime such as the one applied in the UK, regulatory 
intervention is required for promoting gender diversity on corporate boards. However, the soft-law 
approach of recommendatory targets appears to be the best-suited strategy for British boards. In order to 
remedy the situation, the respondents support continued regulatory intervention in British corporate 
governance. However, the level of intervention as recommended by the participants in the study varies. 
Three sub-themes under the theme of solutions to gender homogeneity on boards are identified as non-
financial disclosures, quotas, and the existing soft-law approach. 
 
Regulatory Intervention – Non-financial Disclosures 
 Participants claim that considering the slow progress in improving gender diversity on British boards, 
regulatory intervention is essential to change the culture. The respondents suggest that the companies may 
be asked to submit a non-financial disclosure about their gender diversity status on their boards. 
 “It will only happen when the company starts thinking about non-financial reporting at the corporate 
 level. People see that as ‘the boss wants’.” (Resp. 18 – Male) 
 Respondents support such a move, as it leads to more awareness on the issue of gender diversity on boards 
and transparency in the nomination process. 
 “I am a great believer in openness. Transparency is good. I think that encouraging a change in behaviour 
 is great.” (Resp. 33 – Male) 
 Disclosure on gender diversity on boards will ensure that any progress or the lack of it will be easily 
accessible by the investor, regulatory bodies and other stakeholders. 
 “Transparency, disclosures and all that brings awareness. Having to disclose is very efficient because 
 you have to look at the numbers. And you also have to show the numbers to the world, including 
 potential investors, shareholders, and clients.” (Resp. 21 – Female) 
 Thus non-financial disclosure norms are likely to encourage companies to be more committed to the cause. 
 
Regulatory Intervention – Quotas 
 In the UK, support for statutory intervention for promoting gender diversity on boards has been reported 
in the recent past. Terjesen et al. (2015) quote Virgin founder and CEO Richard Branson who claimed that 
male corporate leaders need to be forced to bring gender parity on boards. Many respondents in the study 
also suggest that a timeline may be set for improving gender diversity on boards through voluntary targets. 
 “My view is how long do we wait. I don’t believe in quotas just at the very beginning of the process. 
 But I also think that the process runs out of speed and time at some point.” (Resp. 22 – Female) 
 Support for quotas is more common among the female directors on British boards than male directors, 
though not all female respondents support and/or call for quotas.  
 “A lot of top women are coming to the conclusion that unless you have quotas, you are not going to 
 make a big change. Because as per the present forecast it would take 80 years before you get to gender 
 parity.” (Resp. 29 – Female) 
 Many countries have implemented gender quotas on the boards of public companies in Continental 
Europe, and the same has been examined in academic research (e.g. Matsa & Miller, 2013; Ahern & 
Dittmar, 2012). Scholars agree that despite natural vested interest to keep a status quo, regulatory authorities 
are obliged to intervene if gender diversity on boards does not improve (Adams & Borsellino, 2015). 
Legislative intervention mandating gender diversity on boards is the most substantial measure to improve 
the representation of women on boards as compared to any action taken by any individual, firm or industry 
(Adams & Kirchmaier 2013; Terjesen et al., 2015). 
 
Soft-law Approach: Best Suited for the UK 
 Presently, the soft-law approach of recommending a framework by the regulatory agencies is widely 
supported by the respondents. The respondents in the study explain that the UK is a different regime to the 
USA, where statutory regulatory intervention is not appreciated by companies, and to the Nordic countries, 
where statutory intervention is the norm. 
 “In the US you can do what you want to do as long as you don’t break the law. In Nordic companies, the 
 societies are much directed and much stricter. Britain, for better or for worse, always held up law as a 
 society. But a lot of it we do is principle based, which means guidance rather than heavy-handed 
 regulation. In the UK I would veer on the side of keeping it (soft-law approach). (Resp. 27 – Male) 
 The participants suggest that the continued regulatory encouragement may improve gender diversity on 
British boards. 
 “I think as a framework, as a long as it is not legislation, it is something that raises it as an agenda for 
 boards to do, regarding their responsibility, (it should continue).” (Resp. 15 – Female) 
 Respondents thus support the current practice of recommendatory voluntary targets to improve board 
diversity in the UK. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 Academic studies often define board diversity from regulators’ or scholars’ perspectives (e.g. Singh et al., 
2008; Grosvold et al., 2007). The study presents the perspective of board directors on the causes of gender 
homogeneity and the solutions to making boards gender balanced in the UK. The participants point out that 
discrimination experienced by women, as perpetrated by employers and by society, leads to their loss of 
confidence. In this paper, only discrimination experienced in the workplace, particularly in leadership 
positions, is discussed. 
 While the respondents’ most favoured diversity management approach for boards is the present soft-law 
approach in the UK, a surprising finding for the authors is the obvious support for gender quotas among 
male and female board directors in UK companies. Earlier academic research has found that female 
directors disapprove of gender quotas as they consider it discriminatory, and also as belittling their efforts 
to reach leadership positions on their merit (e.g. Kakabadse et al., 2015). The same sentiment is echoed in 
this study by a few male and female participants as well. However, the response appears to be generational 
where older board members oppose quotas, and younger ones seem more accepting or even demanding of 
it. 
 The study participants also extol the contribution of the Davies Report (Whitehead & Normand, 2011) in 
making companies and Chairpersons take note of the need to make boards more gender diverse. 
 “I am sure the Davies report was certainly a wake-up call, a kick in the butt for many boards, many 
 chairmen, many companies, to see what they could do about this.” (Resp. 17 –Male) 
 Thus the respondents believe that the present regulatory regime in the UK is delivering results in 
improving gender diversity in boards, with the Davies Report (Whitehead & Normand, 2011) providing the 
necessary impetus. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The soft-law approach adopted in the UK continues to be the most favoured approach for improving 
gender diversity on boards of PLCs. Support for the approach is due to two reasons: historical and the recent 
progress in gender diversity in FTSE boardrooms. The result is also underpinned by Institutional theory 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The Anglo-Saxon system of governance does not favour the intervention of the 
state, as is the case in Continental Europe (Peters, 2011). 
 The study also finds that there is substantial support – particularly among the female directors of FTSE 
boards – for a more interventionist approach from regulators, should the present approach fail to deliver. 
 
CONTRIBUTION 
 
 The paper is based on a study which is guided by Institutional theory, which supports the findings of the 
study. The paper explores the subject of gender diversity on boards from a theoretical perspective which is 
not explored extensively. Thus the study makes a theoretical contribution towards the application of 
Institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
 Institutional theory suggests that the role of the state in the governance of companies varies in different 
regulatory regimes. Thus the soft-law approach is the best strategy for improving gender diversity on British 
boards. The approach suits British companies because it is in accordance with the Anglo-Saxon governance 
system where companies expect minimum statutory regulation in its affairs. 
 The paper explores the measures to improve gender diversity on boards of UK companies. The study is 
conducted in a country under the Common Law regime which has wide reach globally. The study offers 
potential processes (namely addressing discrimination against women and different regulatory 
interventions) to improve boards’ gender diversity, which may be applicable in other countries with similar 
path-dependency (Terjesen et al., 2015). 
 Discrimination and lack of confidence among women are seldom investigated extensively as the causes 
of homogeneity on boards. The paper has explored the subject elaborately. Moreover, non-financial 
disclosure, as suggested by the respondents, is a unique contribution of the study. Another contribution of 
the study is the support for the quotas among FTSE 350 board directors if the voluntary approach fails to 
deliver soon enough. The study also contributes to corporate praxis by indicating potential causes of gender 
homogeneity on boards. Companies may endeavour to address these causes to make boards more gender 
diverse. The study may also guide policy formulation on adoption of the best approach for improving gender 
diversity. 
 
LIMITATION 
 
 The study is conducted with a sample consisting of a ratio of 60:40 male to female respondents. While 
the gender balance (i.e. 50:50) is desired in the dataset, this could not be achieved due to a significantly 
lower proportion of female director on FTSE boards. The respondents often attributed the lack of gender 
diversity on British boards to discrimination against women in society and flawed perceptions about gender. 
However, the paper only presents the responses on discrimination in the workplace, to explore that aspect 
elaborately. 
 Also, the study is conducted with a limited sample set of thirty-three board directors of FTSE 350 
companies. These findings may be further tested with a larger sample in order to understand the views of a 
wider set of corporate leaders. Further studies may attempt to capture the view of regulators, which could 
not be done in this study, to maintain the persuasiveness of the sample. 
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